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ABSTRACT 
The Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) launched with the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
(LRO) on June 18, 2009. While the science function of the LCROSS mission was to determine the presence of 
water-ice in a permanently-shadowed crater on the moon, the operational purpose was to be a pioneer for future low-
cost, risk-tolerant small satellite NASA missions. Recent strategic changes at the Agency level have only furthered 
the importance of small satellite missions. 
NASA Ames Research Center and its industry partner, Northrop-Grumman, initiated this spacecraft project two-
years after its co-manifest mission had started, with less than one-fifth the budget. With a $79M total cost cap 
(including operations and reserves) and 31-months until launch, LCROSS needed a game-changing approach to be 
successful.  
At the LCROSS Confirmation Review, the ESMD Associate Administrator asked the Project team to keep a close 
record of lessons learned through the course of the mission and share their findings with the Agency at the end of the 
mission. This paper summarizes the Project, the mission, its risk position, and some of the more notable lessons 
learned. 
 
THE LCROSS MISSION PROPOSAL 
Early in 2006, the NASA Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate (ESMD) held a competition for NASA 
Centers to propose innovative ideas for a secondary 
payload mission to launch with the Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) to the Moon. The 
successful proposal could cost no more than $80 
million dollars (less was preferred), would have to be 
ready to launch with the LRO in 31 months, could 
weigh no more than 1000 kg (fuelled), and would be 
designated a risk-tolerant “Class D” mission. In effect, 
NASA was offering a fixed-price contract to the 
winning NASA team to stay within a cost and schedule 
cap by accepting an unusually elevated risk position. 
To address this Announcement of Opportunity to 
develop a cost-and-schedule-capped secondary payload 
mission to fly with LRO, NASA Ames Research Center 
(ARC) in Moffett Field, CA, USA embarked on a 
brainstorming effort termed “Blue Ice” in which a small 
team was asked to explore a number of mission 
scenarios that might have a good chance for success 
and still fit within the stated programmatic constraints. 
From this work, ARC developed and submitted six of 
the nineteen mission proposals received by ESMD from 
throughout the Agency, one of which was LCROSS - a 
collaborative effort between ARC and its industrial 
partner, Northrop-Grumman (NG) in Redondo Beach, 
CA, USA.  
In the LCROSS proposal, ARC would manage the 
mission, perform systems engineering and mission 
design (teaming with NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL)), conduct mission and science operations, and 
design/develop the payload instrument suite while NG 
would design and build the innovative spacecraft bus. 
If successful, the LCROSS mission (Fig.1) would 
conduct the first in-situ study of a pristine, permanently 
shadowed lunar crater and test for the presence of water 
ice in a permanently shadowed region, building on 
previous lunar missions, Clementine and Lunar 
Prospector. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100035722 2019-08-30T12:14:02+00:00Z
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Figure 1: The LCROSS Spacecraft 
 
THE LCROSS SELECTION 
After a period of evaluation by ESMD and the Robotic 
Lunar Exploration Program (RLEP), LCROSS was 
selected in a somewhat dramatic “reveal” in 
Washington DC shortly before it was announced at a 
NASA press conference. Just prior to the television 
cameras going live, ESMD Associate Administrator 
(AA) Scott “Doc” Horowitz informed LCROSS Project 
Manager Dan Andrews that ESMD had a very focused 
purpose for LCROSS because it represented a type of 
mission that “is not your father’s NASA”. Horowitz 
acknowledged that there was a place for the heft and 
conservatism of traditional NASA missions, primarily 
in manned spaceflight, but that the Agency also needed 
a way to accomplish tactical missions inexpensively, 
given the financial constraints facing future Agency 
budgets. In LCROSS, he saw an exciting mission, able 
to inspire the public by determining if water-ice is 
present on the Moon, while at the same time proving 
there is a cost-effective way to execute meaningful 
missions on a budget.  
After the press conference, Horowitz and Andrews 
discussed how LCROSS could be a pathfinder project 
for the Agency’s ability to make practical use of excess 
launch capacity, while staying within tough cost & 
schedule constraints. Noting that the Agency would 
increasingly need to rely on smaller, high-leverage, 
cost-capped missions, Horowitz asked Andrews to track 
all that he learned over the next 31 months in bringing 
LCROSS to a successful conclusion. This would 
include how well the NASA Policy Requirements 
(NPRs) served the project, the effectiveness of 
acquisition processes, and how the Program Office and 
Headquarters behaved with this unconventional project. 
Using the LCROSS mission as a prototype, Horowitz 
had a clear vision of how and where this type of 
mission would fit within the NASA portfolio. As he 
later stated in an interview, “I could triple the cost to try 
and guarantee no failure, or I could do three projects 
and even if one fails, I still get more done” 1. 
This key dialogue with the principal mission 
stakeholder established the context for what would 
make a successful LCROSS mission, i.e., cost and 
schedule were key drivers and risks could be taken.   
THE LCROSS SCIENCE MISSION 
The scientific basis for the LCROSS mission had roots 
in the Clementine (1994) and Lunar Prospector (1998) 
Missions which performed complementary forms of 
resource mapping. This mapping led the lunar science 
community to conclude that there might be water-ice 
trapped in permanently shadowed craters on the Moon. 
The Clementine Mission 2 was launched in 1994 from 
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California aboard a 
Titan IIG rocket. It was a joint project between the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization in 
Washington and NASA, with the objective of making 
scientific observations of the Moon, assessing the 
surface mineralogy, and obtaining lunar altimetry or 
imagery from a fixed altitude. 
The Lunar Prospector Mission 2 was launched in 1998 
aboard a Lockheed Martin solid-fuel, three-stage 
Athena II rocket. The Lunar Prospector Mission was 
the third selected by NASA for the Discovery Program. 
Lunar Prospector was managed out of NASA ARC, 
with Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor. The 19-
month mission was designed for a low polar orbit 
investigation of the Moon, including mapping of 
surface composition and possible polar ice deposits, 
completely covering the lunar surface twice a month. 
Originally, the mission was to have simply ended with 
the spacecraft inevitably crashing into the lunar surface 
once it expended all its fuel. As the mission neared its 
end, however, the suggestion was made to use the crash 
as part of an experiment to confirm the existence of 
water on the Moon. The spacecraft was successfully 
directed into a crater near the lunar South Pole, but the 
impact plume was not significant, probably due to a 
poor impact angle and low spacecraft mass. 
Both of these missions were instrumental in the lunar 
ice question. In particular, the Lunar Prospector 
Mission (LP) neutron measurements indicated elevated 
hydrogen signatures in permanently-shadowed craters 
on both the North and South poles of the Moon. In light 
of these data, the science community wondered if these 
elevated hydrogen signatures could be an indication of 
the presence of water-ice, trapped just beneath the 
regolith surface of the crater floors.  
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If water does exist on the Moon, it could have arrived 
the same way water did on Earth - through billions of 
years of bombardment by meteors and comets. 
However, because the Moon’s gravity is less than one 
fifth of Earth’s gravity, the Moon retains practically no 
atmosphere and any deposition on the Moon's surface 
would be subject to direct exposure to both the vacuum 
of space and daylight temperatures that reach up to 
250° Fahrenheit. In the North and South polar regions, 
however, the sun never rises above certain crater rims 
so sunlight never reaches the crater floor. With 
temperatures estimated to be near -328° Fahrenheit (-
200° C), these craters can “cold trap” or capture most 
volatiles, such as water. 
Given the expense of bringing water from Earth to the 
surface of the moon (from $15K to $50K for the 
equivalent of a ½ litre bottle), finding water-ice in 
sufficient quantities in these permanently shadowed 
craters could result in a compelling rationale for 
locating lunar outposts in the vicinity of this valuable 
resource. An in-situ resource like water that could be 
converted to consumable water, breathable oxygen, 
rocket fuel, and potentially even used as a means for 
construction when combined with regolith, or as a 
shielding means from solar radiation, would make 
inhabitation and exploration of the Moon a much more 
achievable future reality.  
THE LCROSS MISSION 
LCROSS proposed to conduct a low-cost, fast-track 
companion mission to launch with LRO. The Atlas 
launch vehicle used for the LRO mission consists of a 
booster stage and the Centaur upper stage. The 
LCROSS spacecraft would be mounted atop the 
Centaur with the LRO spacecraft mounted atop 
LCROSS (Fig. 2).  
With a mass constraint of 1000 Kg, LCROSS proposed 
to use the upper stage of the Atlas-V rocket (the 
“Centaur”), normally space junk after delivering a 
payload, to effectively triple the size of its working 
payload. By repurposing the spent Centaur to LCROSS, 
mission planners were able to stay within the 1000 Kg 
mass budget allotted to the secondary payload while 
gaining approximately 2300 Kg of mass “for free”. 
Proposing the use the Centaur as a lunar kinetic 
impactor, LCROSS would “drop” the 2300 Kg rocket 
(about the weight of a large sports utility vehicle) into a 
permanently-shadowed crater, at a speed of 1.5 
miles/second (2.5 km/s) or three times the speed of a 
bullet, to kick-up a plume of material from the crater 
floor. The 1000 Kg LCROSS “Shepherding Spacecraft” 
would then collect and transmit data about the impact 
and plume back to LCROSS mission control using nine 
 
Figure 2: TheLRO/LCROSS Launch Vehicle Stack 
on-board science instruments before impacting the 
surface itself, about 4 minutes after the Centaur. 
On June 18, 2009, LCROSS and LRO launched aboard 
an Atlas V rocket from Cape Canaveral, in Florida, 
USA. Once the Atlas V achieved the LRO lunar 
insertion requirement, LRO separated, enabling it to 
independently move forward on its mission, leaving 
LCROSS and the still-attached Centaur behind. The 
Centaur then performed a series of venting maneuvers 
to eliminate gasses which could contaminate the lunar 
impact measurement. The Centaur then became an 
inert, empty vessel and an official part of the LCROSS 
mission. Approximately five days after launch, 
LCROSS entered into an extended Lunar Gravity-
Assist, Lunar Return Orbit (LGALRO) by performing a 
lunar-swing-by of the moon. The cruise phase of the 
mission lasted slightly more than 100 days before 
entering into the terminal phase of the mission. In the 
meantime, LCROSS’ long, high-inclination orbit 
around the Earth gave the LRO mission time to 
commission its instruments and collect data about the 
South Pole craters to help the LCROSS science team 
refine target crater selection. In fact, this LRO data led 
to LCROSS changing the impact crater from Cabeus-A 
to Cabeus. Cabeus had more relevant conditions related 
to the fundamental water question, but was a much 
deeper crater. Although it was known that this crater 
change would negatively impact Earth observations, it 
was the scientifically proper strategy for the mission 
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because the first priority of the LCROSS PM and 
science team was to assure scientific relevance. 
During the cruise phase, LCROSS maintained its Earth 
cruise orbit by executing several Trajectory Correction 
Maneuvers (TCMs) to provide for the final lunar 
approach required to position the Centaur for its 
ballistic lunar impact. Following the final TCM, the 
Centaur and the Shepherding Spacecraft separated 
about nine hours before impact (Fig. 3) followed by the  
 
Figure 3: LCROSS Separating from Centaur 
Shepherding Spacecraft performing a braking maneuver 
to enable the release Centaur to impact the Moon first. 
This delay provided time for the Shepherding 
spacecraft to observe the ejecta plume arising from the 
Centaur impact. The Centaur’s impact is estimated to 
have excavated 250-350 metric tons of regolith, leaving 
an impact crater approximately 82 feet (25 m) in 
diameter. LCROSS thermal images of the ejecta plume 
development and the resultant Centaur crater as seen by 
the LCROSS NIR camera while 14km above the crater 
floor, can be seen in Figs. 4 & 5 3.  
LCROSS discovered that regolith in this permanently 
shadowed crater was very fine with a talc-like 
consistency. Much of the kinetic energy of the Centaur 
impact was converted into thermal energy into the local 
soil creating a notable vapor cloud. Less energy went 
into rock and dirt ejecta being thrown upward given the 
nature of the crater floor regolith. As the Shepherding 
 
Figure 4: LCROSS Impact Plume 
 
Figure 5: LCROSS Centaur Impact Crater 
Spacecraft continued its delayed decent, cameras and 
sensors in the instrument suite were able to measure the 
constituents of the Centaur ejecta plume, observing and 
measuring all the way down to the inevitable impact on 
the Moon four minutes later. The sensors on LRO were 
able to make notable measurements of the nature of the 
ejecta and impact plume, providing excellent 
complementary data on the LCROSS impact. 
THE LCROSS PAYLOAD INSTRUMENTS 
The LCROSS instrument payload was designed to 
provide mission scientists with multiple complimentary 
views of the debris plume created by the Centaur 
impact. The instrument suite consisted of nine 
instruments: one visible, two near-infrared and two 
mid-infrared cameras; one visible and two near-infrared 
spectrometers; and a photometer - all optimized to 
answer the fundamental question about water ice. 
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LCROSS Science 
As the impact debris plume rises above the target 
crater’s rim, it is exposed to sunlight and any water-ice, 
hydrocarbons or organics are vaporized and break down 
into their basic components. These components are 
primarily monitored by the visible and infrared 
spectrometers. The near-infrared and mid-infrared 
cameras determine the total amount and distribution of 
water in the debris plume. The spacecraft’s visible 
camera tracks the impact location and the behaviour of 
the debris plume while the visible photometer measures 
the flash created by the Centaur impact. Finally, to 
gather all this instrument data together, LCROSS 
employs a Data Handling Unit (DHU) for transmission 
back to LCROSS Mission Control.  
These instruments were selected to be low-cost, rugged, 
commercially available components for an Earth 
environment. However, to ensure survival in both space 
and launch environments, the LCROSS payload team 
needed to put the individual instruments though 
rigorous testing to simulate launch and the conditions in 
space. When that testing revealed weaknesses, the team 
worked with the manufacturers to strengthen their 
designs for satisfactory use in the LCROSS mission. 
NASA CLASS D MISSIONS 
A key enabling factor for LCROSS success was its 
designation by the ESMD Associate Administrator as a 
risk-tolerant Class D mission. NASA classifies all 
spaceflight missions into one of four categories based 
on risk tolerance: Class A, B, C, and D. This 
classification system has origins in the Department of 
Defense (DoD) Military Standards (Mil-STDS) 
documents which NASA has tailored into a Safety and 
Mission Assurance (S&MA) NASA Procedural 
Requirement (NPR 8705.4) 4. 
Class A missions, at the risk intolerant end of the 
spectrum, tend to be large, expensive missions, and/or 
manned spaceflight missions where human lives are put 
in harm’s way. Class A missions are typically 
formulated with generous technical margins, schedule 
slack and reserve dollars to address the need for 
redundant systems and extensive testing to assure 
requirements satisfaction with reliability – all of which 
lead to elevated cost. 
Class D missions, at the other end of the risk spectrum, 
are the most risk-tolerant missions in NASA. While 
safety concerns are treated no differently for a Class D 
mission than a Class A mission, Class D missions are 
allowed to be “single strung”, which means there is no 
redundancy required. In fact, as it states in NPR 8705.4, 
“Medium or significant risk of not achieving mission 
success is permitted”, so this type of mission can fail. 
Class D designation is typically applied to small 
missions that are constrained in some way making it 
harder to assure mission success. For LCROSS, the 
Agency Class D designation was in place to improve 
the likelihood it could make the LRO launch date, 
within budget. 
LCROSS AS A CLASS D MISSION 
When LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission, 
technical risk officially became part of the mission 
trade space. Because the mission was cost-capped, cost 
maintenance was essential. The Project cost cap had to 
be maintained even if at the expense of technical 
requirements as the mission could be cancelled if the 
cost cap was exceeded. LCROSS was also schedule-
constrained since it had to make the LRO launch date. 
As a result, LCROSS was permitted to waive 
performance requirements or take additional risk as 
necessary to fit into the schedule and cost constraints.  
The Program Office handled the Level 2 (L2) 
requirements levied on the LCROSS Project in a similar 
manner, establishing “Minimum” and “Full Success 
Criteria” to set priorities if requirements trades had to 
be made. The L2 requirements document specifically 
listed, by number, the requirements that were Minimum 
Success criteria, leaving the rest to be Full Success 
criteria and able to be traded if required. This document 
effectively told LCROSS Project Management, “if you 
are forced to start dumping some of your requirements, 
here’s how we’d like you to prioritize them.” Achieving 
concurrence up front on acceptable ways to make 
contingency trades saved time and heartache as the 
mission progressed. 
Class D Challenges 
As a Class D mission, LCROSS quickly discovered that 
although the designation was adequately defined in the 
cited NPR, there was little or no reference to this risk 
classification in other NASA policy documents. 
Further, approaches that the LCROSS team had the 
latitude to execute may not have been permitted by 
other NPRs, effectively driving the mission class 
higher. As pioneers for the Class D mission 
designation, LCROSS Project Management soon found 
that internal contradictions and discontinuities between 
policy documents were their problems to resolve. 
Another issue associated with the Class D risk 
designation was its extensibility to the spacecraft 
contractor, Northrop-Grumman. The NASA Class D 
designation established a performance standard for the 
execution of the Project, but it was not necessarily in 
alignment with how the spacecraft contractor could 
operate within their own corporate constraints. The NG 
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part of the LCROSS team started the process of finding 
their own equivalent of a Class D approach within their 
existing, approved corporate processes. Although they 
were able to find an existing approach that streamlined 
oversight and approval processes to helped them to 
come into Class D alignment, it required them to 
address two important issues: 1) Is a corporate entity 
willing/able to take the same risks of failure defined by 
the NASA Class D mission designation and 2) Does 
this work within their own framework of shareholders? 
In the end, the answers were the same for NG and 
ARC. Neither organization came together to manage 
the LCROSS Project just to see it fail, regardless of 
mission class. So the LCROSS team had to find ways to 
keep risk in check while staying within the cost and 
schedule caps. 
One of the burdens of being a pathfinder for the Class 
D mission construct was the need to advocate for new 
approaches with stakeholders. For NASA stakeholders, 
LCROSS advocated for approaches that involved 
tailoring existing policies rather than waiving policies 
altogether. This approach avoided time-consuming 
resistance to waiving which leads to stakeholder 
questions such as, “This procedural requirement is in 
place because past experience shows that this 
requirement is a wise thing to do… so justify why you 
do not feel it is wise for your project”? For NG 
corporate stakeholders, both tailoring and waiving 
existing processes had to be employed to gain 
acceptance, particularly from NG mission assurance 
organizations. In fact, the NG Project Manager for 
LCROSS once said, “We had to create a waiver to the 
waiver process”, since he had to overcome the same 
difficulties as the ARC Project Manager did with 
NASA stakeholders. 
Finally, there was the challenge of integrating the Class 
D LCROSS mission with the Class B/C LRO and the 
Class A Atlas launch vehicle. In the end, the lowest 
common denominator, i.e., least risk-tolerant approach, 
prevailed, which was counter to the LCROSS context. 
For example, in the case of structural margins, 
LCROSS had done some analysis calculations that 
showed generous margins on natural frequencies of the 
propulsion tank and the secondary structure. Atlas and 
LRO concurred that the computed frequencies were 
good numbers, but wanted additional verification of 
those numbers that were based only on analysis. 
Because this level of additional verification was in 
alignment with the mission risk position for LRO, 
LCROSS was forced to conduct testing on the structure 
and propellant tank to verify the analysis. Because the 
monies expended to satisfy another mission’s risk 
position exceeded the LCROSS cost cap, Project 
Management successfully advocated for the Program 
Office to pay for the cost of enhanced LCROSS testing. 
MANAGING THE LCROSS RISK EQUATION  
Managing the mission success risk equation for 
LCROSS involved management of the three traditional 
elements – cost, schedule, and technical capabilities. 
Because cost and schedule were constrained, technical 
capability was really the only element that could be 
actively managed.  
Cost Risk + Schedule Risk + Technical Risk = Mission Risk 
Although LCROSS had a Class D mission designation 
allowing a higher-than-normal mission risk, it was in 
everyone’s interest to keep that risk as low as possible 
to increase the chances of success. By definition then, 
the technical capability risk also had to be kept as low 
as possible, primarily by keeping the complexity level 
as low as possible.  
Lowering Complexity Lowers Risk 
If a system is designed to be low in complexity, extra 
margin is effectively added to the technical risk element 
– margin that can be traded if developmental difficulties 
are encountered later on in the project. For example, if 
procurement is taking longer than planned, thereby 
increasing schedule risk in a schedule-capped mission, 
that risk can be reduced by reducing the unit-level 
testing that was originally planned. While not testing at 
a unit level runs the risk of problems not emerging until 
box-level testing occurs, if the system is of low-
complexity, the risk of that occurring might be worth 
the trade. If that unit-level device has been proven on a 
previous mission and is being re-used in the same way 
as on that previous mission, the risk may be small. If 
the card in which testing is reduced is easily 
removed/replaced from the avionics box, making a later 
discovery of a problem would not represent a large 
problem and thus, may be worth the trade. 
Alternatively, continuing with all the unit and 
subsystem level testing is also an option, but it reduces 
the degree of integrated systems testing to a minimum 
to recover schedule. Judgment is required to make these 
trades, and there is technical risk. The key is to find 
ways to keep that risk in check, even in a risk-tolerant 
environment. 
Capabilities-Driven Missions Lower Risk 
Keeping that technical risk in check meant the 
LCROSS mission was not about pushing the limits of 
technology and performance. This particular mission 
was about doing as much as possible within existing 
capabilities of the system. In other words, “We want it 
all, but we know we need appetite suppressants.” 5 
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Capability-driven missions like LCROSS are exactly 
what the name implies: working to achieve 
requirements by staying as much as possible within the 
capabilities of the system. This is very different than 
many science-driven NASA missions where needed 
capabilities are defined and then efforts to meet them 
are defined to meet the mission requirements. That 
approach is too open-ended and can involve a full 
development and test cycle which is fraught with risk 
and can be costly in schedule consumption. LCROSS 
was a Design-to-Cost 6 project, working within cost and 
schedule constraints that were the principal drivers for 
the project. By working as much as possible with 
existing designs, LCROSS had a set of proven 
capabilities that helped to contain cost and schedule. 
The perfect incarnation of a capability-driven project 
requires little to no modifications over what has been 
done before. Everything is not only flight-proven, but 
proven in the identical arrangement and configuration 
of how it will be used on the project. Clearly, this 
scenario is not typical, so a real Design-to-Cost project 
needs to carry sufficient risk margins for not only the 
unknowns, but for the inevitable effort required to 
address the risk associated with expanding capabilities 
where required. Of course, requirements descope is 
always an option as it effectively designs in technical 
risk margin to accommodate more mass or power needs 
as the project evolves. 
 “Glue Missions” Lower Risk 
By using and “gluing together” already-proven 
hardware, software, and Integration & Test (I&T) 
approaches, the residual technical risk for LCROSS 
resided primarily in the design effort of “gluing” the 
components together, as well as general component 
workmanship issues which are always present. In 
addition to lowering technical risk, “Glue Missions” 
also tend to keep cost and schedule risk in check 
because the simplicity and heritage extensibility makes 
it less likely extra time and money will be needed to 
remediate a problem.  
Payload Glue 
LCROSS was conceived using Commercial Off The 
Shelf (COTS) instruments from various vendors best 
suited to meet the mission needs. When COTS 
instruments are used, however, the issue of getting all 
the instruments to successfully communicate with the 
spacecraft avionics inevitably arises. The visible 
camera vendor for the LCROSS payload had an 
interface unit which enabled a number of their cameras 
to be connected to a single interface point and was a 
standard product. If the cameras and instruments from 
other vendors could be configured to interface with this 
unit as well, LCROSS could avoid the risk of 
developing custom, flight-ready blackbox solutions for 
each instrument, thereby saving both development 
effort and risk. In the end, the other instrument vendors 
were able to deploy an RS-422 interface option that 
enabled their units to work with the visible camera 
vendor’s single-point data handling unit. Once the 
instruments were “glued” to the data handling unit 
through the use of a common RS-422 data format, the 
data handler was “glued” to the spacecraft avionics 
through the use of another standard data protocol – 
again saving untold hours in development and in-flight 
suitability testing -  and reducing overall risk.   
Spacecraft Glue 
In science-driven missions, the development of a 
spacecraft bus frequently involves a custom design 
tailored to the particular needs of the mission – a labor-
intensive effort that also requires costly verification for 
flight suitability. In the capabilities-driven LCROSS 
mission, an existing, proven piece of hardware called an 
ESPA (Evolvable Secondary Payload Adaptor) ring 
(Fig. 6), which was already designed for flight on the 
launch vehicle, was chosen to be the basis of the 
LCROSS spacecraft bus. Originally designed to carry  
 
Figure 6: LCROSS ESPA Ring 
multiple secondary payloads at six circular ports around 
the perimeter of the ring while simultaneously 
supporting the loads from a primary payload mounted 
on top, the ESPA ring’s purpose was to make use of 
excess launch capability for multiple secondary 
payloads. LCROSS, however, was the first to use this 
standardized capability to develop the backbone of a 
spacecraft, using the ports to mount various elements of 
a single spacecraft. One port supported the solar array; 
another port supported the battery panel; another port 
supported the payload instruments, etc. (Fig. 7). 
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The standardized ESPA hardware provided the “glue” 
to connect the primary and secondary mission payloads 
together without the need for costly customized systems 
or components. As an added bonus, using the ESPA 
ring resulted in a more resilient assembly process for 
LCROSS as each of the panels could be worked-on 
independently. 
 
 
Figure 7: LCROSS ESPA Ring and Secondary 
Panels 
Mission Operations Glue 
Traditional spacecraft control rooms are expensive 
operations, filling large rooms with wall-to-wall people 
and monitor screens. To stay under the cost cap, 
LCROSS had to find a different approach, so a humble 
control room with a series of personal computers was 
set up and “glued” together over a local secure network 
(Fig. 8). Not flashy, but fully functional, the LCROSS 
Ground Data System (GDS) ran the same software that 
was used during Integration & Test to leverage training 
and investments made earlier in the project, and again, 
to keep technical risk in check. 
MANAGING LCROSS REQUIREMENTS 
Given the LCROSS mission success equation with its 
cost-and-schedule constraints, managing technical 
capabilities in the form of project requirements became 
even more important. LCROSS project requirements 
defined the critical performance metrics of the mission 
as well as the previously mentioned success criteria. 
Although the LCROSS minimum success criteria 
required no performance from the payload at all, the 
spacecraft pointing performance was still required to 
meet the minimum mission success requirements of 
 
Figure 8: LCROSS Mission Ops Control Room 
directing the Centaur into the chosen crater, so those 
requirements were primary. Secondary requirements 
were those that would achieve Full Mission Success for 
LCROSS. Secondary requirements necessarily involved 
the payload instruments because Full Success Criteria 
required the LCROSS spacecraft to perform in-situ 
measurements determining the presence and quantity of 
water-ice. Tertiary requirements, then, were those that 
would be interesting to have, but not required for 
achieving primary or secondary success criteria. 
Thus, the LCROSS mission requirements could be 
categorized as follows: 
Minimum (primary) Success Requirements - needed to 
assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, permanently 
shadowed crater. 
Full (secondary) Success Requirements - needed to 
assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, permanently 
shadowed crater, and the LCROSS spacecraft is able to 
make in-situ water-ice measurements of the ejecta 
plume.  
Extended Full (tertiary) Success Requirements – needed 
to assure the impactor is sent into a targeted, 
permanently shadowed crater, and the LCROSS 
spacecraft is able to make in-situ water-ice 
measurements of the ejecta plume and make other 
interesting measurements related to the ejecta plume. 
By prioritizing requirements in this manner, 
requirements could be cut from the third category, and 
possibly the second without endangering mission 
success, should the need arise. For example, if it were 
determined that the LCROSS Shepherding Spacecraft 
could not be separated from the Centaur on orbit, all 
requirements from the second and third categories 
would be eliminated because the payload instruments 
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would become part of the Centaur impact. However, the 
mission would still be considered a success even if the 
entire stack was crashed into the Moon, as long as the 
Minimum Success Requirements were met and impact 
took place in a targeted, permanently shadowed crater. 
MANAGING CAPABILITIES-DRIVEN 
MISSIONS 
With the list of mission requirements clearly prioritized, 
LCROSS implemented the previously discussed 
Design-to-Cost process using existing capabilities. 
COTS instruments were sought for payloads. Although 
flight-proven instruments were preferred (the visible 
camera was flight-proven), well-established instruments 
from the commercial or industrial world that were 
already ruggedized to improve the feasibility of use in a 
space and launch environment were accepted. Those 
instruments were subsequently tested in relevant 
environments (vacuum, temperature extremes, 
vibration, etc.) to see if the units could withstand 
anticipated mission conditions. Instrument vendors, 
interested in opening new markets for their products 
and happy that such rigorous use-testing was being 
funded by the government, were cooperative in 
upgrading their products when issues were discovered. 
For example, one instrument failed because a screw 
came loose during vibrational testing. It was discovered 
that no adhesive had been applied to the screw threads 
to help secure the screws in a dynamic load 
environment. Once adhesive was applied, the device 
passed testing and was accepted for use. In another 
case, a cable came loose inside an instrument because 
the cable was not staked-down to help reduce the length 
of unsupported cable experiencing the loads of a launch 
environment. This, too, was easily remedied. 
The final suite of LCROSS instruments included a 
thermal camera (MID-IR1) used in motorsports 
applications, Near-IR spectrometers (NSP1 & NSP2) 
used in beer-making and carpet fiber analysis for 
assessing recyclability, UV visible spectrometers 
(UVS) used in standard bench-top laboratory 
equipment, a visible camera routinely used in shuttle 
launch imagery, and Near-IR cameras (NIR-cam) used 
in fiber optic communications applications. All of these 
were existing hardware that was repurposed for the 
LCROSS space mission. 
To employ existing capabilities for the LCROSS 
spacecraft, well-proven, flight-demonstrated hardware 
was chosen, some of which was even re-purposed. The 
best example of this was the previously described 
ESPA ring, originally designed to mount between a 
launch vehicle and spacecraft it is carrying, but used by 
LCROSS as a spacecraft structure. Avionics, batteries, 
propellant tank, thrusters, transponder, and other 
equipment - all proven on other missions – reduced the 
risk/uncertainty of performance on LCROSS. Along 
with proven capabilities came bounded cost. By using 
existing hardware, cost risk remained in check. When 
existing designs are altered, development risk - and the 
cost for covering that risk - increases. 
By employing capabilities-driven management, 
LCROSS adhered to the Design-to-Cost process and 
was able to meet all cost, schedule, and technical 
capability mission requirements. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
When LCROSS successfully passed its Confirmation 
Review in which the Project was officially green-
lighted to be a flight mission, the LCROSS Project 
Manager provided a courtesy outbrief to the ESMD 
Associate Administrator, Scott “Doc” Horowitz. The 
outbrief discussed LCROSS scope, approaches, and 
plans. Very interested in the execution of this novel 
mission, Horowitz made the following specific request 
of the LCROSS team in front of his entire executive 
staff: 
“I want you to take lots of notes as you go through the 
mission and come back here and brief me on what 
you’ve learned over the course of LCROSS. I think 
there will be much that can be applied even to Class A 
missions.” 
Although Horowitz was no longer the AA for ESMD 
when the mission struck the moon in 2009,the LCROSS 
Team honored their commitment and briefed ESMD 
with the following series of top “Lessons-Learned” 
which were culled from the hundreds collected and 
officially submitted to The Agency Office of Chief 
Engineer 
LESSON: Embed Mission Operations (MOS) Staff in 
Spacecraft Testing 
The LCROSS cost-capped mission did not have the 
budget for a shadow MOS team to be available 
throughout project development that could then fly the 
mission and develop all the requisite products required 
during development. So a novel approach was 
formulated to make use of embedded NASA engineers 
at Northrop-Grumman. The first NASA engineer was 
embeded with Northrop-Grumman during LCROSS 
spacecraft “FlatSat” testing, when all the avionics were 
connected together and tested with the flight software. 
This “Liaison Engineer” did not simply observe 
activities as if in a mission assurance role. He was there 
to truly embed with the technical work doing early 
verification of the flight software and avionics. This 
approach proved to be so effective that the Liason 
Engineer started writing scripts and executing them as a 
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full member of the team, quickly garnering full trust 
and even accolades from the NG team. 
The same approach was taken later in the project when 
LCROSS entered into spacecraft Integration & Test 
(I&T) and embedded another NASA engineer with the 
NG team. This engineer also got closely involved in the 
verification activities, and in doing so, was able to 
participate in the resolution of integration issues and 
witness the emerging  “personality” of the spacecraft. 
While this embedding clearly benefitted the LCROSS 
Project Manager and Project Systems Engineer by 
providing a virtual presence in the activities, it also 
proved to have other benefits when the two embedded 
engineers became the Flight Controllers for the 
LCROSS mission. These NASA engineers became the 
people who issued all commands to the spacecraft and 
had some of the best understanding of that spacecreaft’s 
behavior. Also, when anomalous events did occur, the 
experience these engineers gained by being embedded 
with the NG team brought valuable insight to 
discussion of those anomalies. Of course, the NASA 
LCROSS Ops team had employed NG in a “back 
room” capacity for monitoring the spacecraft, but 
having that first-hand knowledge available in the 
Mission Ops Control Room proved to be invaluable. 
The lesson here is to carefully consider the best 
application of embedding staff, within existing budget 
constraints. If there is plenty of money, then a very 
large MOS team shadowing S/C I&T may be an option. 
If not, then the careful, thrifty application of skills in 
the mix of activities can be very helpful. 
LESSON: Have Technical Freeboard Somewhere 
LCROSS was cast as a Class D mission, which means it 
can accept more technical risk than other mission types 
in NASA. So why have “freeboard”, a.k.a. extra 
technical margin? As noted earlier, one of the ways that 
LCROSS kept its risk in check was by keeping 
complexity as low as possible while satisfying project 
requirements. To address the remaining complexity in 
the design, having technical performance measures 
which have a fair amount of margin could be 
invaluable. This extra margin is a commodity that can 
be used in many different and sometimes unplanned 
ways during the mission. Extra fuel, power, thermal, or 
RF link can provide operational degrees of freedom 
when anomalies are encountered. 
LCROSS had “freeboard” margin with its power 
system. The LCROSS solar array was electrically 
“hot”, meaning it generated much more power than was 
actually needed to execute the mission. As a result, 
LCROSS could point as much as 60 degrees off of sun 
before the power generated by the system was 
insufficient, or “power negative”. This freeboard on 
electrical power meant not only that the mission could 
consume more power than planned, it could also be 
used as an added resource to handle emergencies. 
For example, on orbit it was discovered that two of 
thruster propellant lines were getting sufficiently cold 
to be dangerously close to freezing the propellant in the 
lines, thereby running the risk of a line breach. The root 
cause of this proved to be related to the location of the 
heater thermostats. The mitigation option would be to 
consider re-writing the flight software to trigger the 
heaters earlier based on thermister  feedback, but flight 
software changes are very dangerous as they break 
systems verification which can result in unintended 
consequences elsewhere in the code. Having a power 
“freeboard”, however, meant that instead of changing 
the flight software code, LCROSS could tolerate being 
pointed a bit off sun, using the sun to heat the thrusters 
and lines directly. This was accomplished by yawing 
spacecraft 20[deg] toward the sun which effectively 
raised the rear thrusters out from behind the shadow of 
the spacecraft, exposing them directly to the sun’s heat. 
.Although this maneuver caused the solar array to no 
longer be pointing directly at the sun, the existence of 
the LCROSS power “freeboard” still meant there were 
still sufficient power resources for the mission. 
Additionally, LCROSS had plenty of battery capacity 
onboard which meant that the hot solar array could 
store more energy for use in failsafe scenarios where 
the spacecraft is put into a non-solar facing “drift” state, 
allowing it to go power-negative to preserve propellant. 
Having that extra power capacity meant the spacecraft 
could be in such a state for longer periods of time, 
providing a more robust recovery. 
Another LCROSS “freeboard” area was with its fuel 
margin. This margin was a product of having made use 
of an existing tank size (recall the importance of 
capabilities-driven) and larger than needed to execute 
the mission. This extra capacity proved its worth at 
least twice during the mission. In one case, the Centaur 
fill/drain valves leaked more than anticipated and 
represented a disturbance force to LCROSS which 
consumed more propellant to offset. In another case, an 
on-orbit anomaly caused excessive firing of the 
LCROSS thrusters which consumed considerably more 
propellant than planned.. In each of these cases, having 
the freeboard on fuel reserves helped the mission 
survive. 
LESSON: TTAYF: Test/Train As You Fly 
The mantras, “Test, Test, Test” and, “Train, Train, 
Train” are good policies because they are the best way 
to understand both the capabilities and limits of the 
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spacecraft and of the team. Unfortunately, these labor 
and facility-intensive activities may consume a great 
deal of financial resources – the cost-capped project’s 
most precious commodity. TTAYF was employed on 
LCROSS to attempt to strike a balance between the 
value of testing and training and the cost of doing so. 
As a result, LCROSS had to focus on the most 
meaningful and relevant performance of both the 
hardware and the people.  
Test As You Fly verifies spacecraft functionality in the 
ways it will be required to perform on orbit. LCROSS 
could not perform a full suite of qualification testing 
due to cost constraints, but still needed to ensure that 
the basic mission was viable. So qualification testing 
for off-nominal anomaly-handling, although a nice to 
have, would have to be addressed by the Ops team 
when anomalies actually surfaced. 
Train As You Fly verifies that the Ops team can handle 
the actual nominal activities of the mission. This 
training was done first with “Engineering Readiness 
Tests” (ERTs), and then later with “Operational 
Readiness Tests” (ORTs). ERTs required all 
operational functionality be in place to fly the mission 
(telemetry, commanding, ground station connectivity 
operator screens complete, etc), but was not conducted 
in real time. ORTs were the exact same thing, but 
conducted in real time. In fact, they were not only 
conducted in real time duration, but at the real time of 
the day, so that the team could experience carrying a 
shift in the middle of the night when they might be tired 
and hungry. The value of the ERTs was that it revealed 
any technical or procedural flaws with the plan and 
could be adapted as needed to make sure everything 
was feasible. The value of the ORTs was that staff had 
to endure real-time decision-making and mission stress, 
revealing weaknesses with a small team. Further, 
during the ORTs, the Test Conductor, who did not have 
an official console position, would “throw sticks in the 
spokes” of the operations folks to test their 
responsiveness. At the end of an ORT, the Test 
Conductor would discuss all he did to the team, and 
most importantly, evaluate how quickly they were able 
to see anomalies he introduced, and in some cases, 
minor anomalies they never saw. The Test Conductor 
addition to the ORTs cost only one additional FTE and 
proved to be invaluable. It was common during an ORT 
for the spacecraft to lose an Inertial Reference Unit 
(IRU), or the telemetry would grow stale due to a lost 
ground station link, or a console location would lose 
power, etc, etc. The team treated these ORT exercises 
very seriously as if they were actually flying a 
spacecraft. Further, since ORTs are run in real time, the 
operation crew had to react in a timely manner, noting 
things like a communication pass about to expire and 
having to deal with potential declaration of emergency 
to get more time to safe the spacecraft. The operations 
team definitely benefitted from this type of training 
when the real mission was flown and real anomalies 
were experienced. 
LESSON: NASA Policy Documents Do Not Cross-Cut 
Mission Class 
The lesson only applies to NASA missions, but it is a 
critical one. The whole Class D premise comes from a 
NASA Policy Requirement called NPR 8705.4. As 
discussed earlier, this document defines, in somewhat 
vague terms, what it means to be a Class A, B, C, or D 
mission. LCROSS’ approaches with Class D were 
based in this NPR, and similar NG policy documents. 
NPR 8705.4 is helpful in providing a construct, but is 
somewhat vague, which gives projects and stakeholders 
some room to tailor their activities – a good thing; 
however, where the problem surfaces is with the many 
other NASA Policy Requirements which do not address 
mission class at all. Good examples are NPR 7120.5 
which is the Policy document covering the management 
of projects and programs, and NPR 7123.1 which is the 
Agency’s Systems Engineering NPR defining technical 
performance requirements. These two NPRs are critical, 
foundational NPRs which the stakeholders use to assure 
that the NASA project is executing to the defined 
standards of the Agency. The problem of course is that 
these NPRs apply to missions of all costs, sizes, 
importance levels, and yes, mission class. Without 
separate delineation of mission class in these 
foundational requirements documents, small team Class 
D projects are carrying the same requirements as much 
larger Flagship missions. There is the ability to waive 
requirements, but the process of waiving necessarily 
comes with the burden of advocating, explaining, and 
defending the waiver. Unintentionally, these one-size-
fits-all rules encumber the small team with adjudication 
efforts of the stakeholders. 
Classification of a mission as “D” is put in place to help 
it be successful with programmatic constraints, but the 
reality is that the small team finds itself in the position 
of having to define/justify Class D activities to multiple 
stakeholder parties of different views – making more 
work for the team. The Agency is thus advised to 
consider creating a lightweight pathway for small 
satellite / small-team missions which is not overly 
prescriptive, but offers requirements options that can 
achieve lower project overhead. 
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LESSON: Risk Tolerant Missions Require Good Risk 
Management 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned by the 
LCROSS team was that even risk-tolerant missions 
need to employ good risk management practices to be 
successful.  
Given the cost constraints of mission, LCROSS could 
not afford to eliminate risk – a goal more appropriately 
associated with Class A missions where people’s lives 
hang in the balance.  For Class D missions like 
LCROSS, there is simply not enough time or money. 
So if the LCROSS team could not eliminate risk, what 
risks should be mitigated and what risks left alone? It 
became apparent that LCROSS required very careful 
risk management specifically because it could accept 
elevated levels of technical risk. LCROSS Risk 
Management Boards (RMBs) had to study risk 
impact/likelihood and carefully trade risks against each 
other. Although initially thought to be a tedious, long, 
and encumbering process, RMBs were ultimately seen 
by the LCROSS team as having great importance. They 
were never fun, but the team leads were always good 
with their attendance because they knew they had to 
strike a balance to meet their own schedule and cost 
objectives. 
An interesting example of this, which occurred in many 
RMBs, was when a risk mitigation discussion led to not 
executing a mitigation. During a discussion of a 
payload instrument risk, the team of engineers was 
discussing ways to mitigate the risk with this change or 
that, adding heaters or making some aspect redundant, 
etc. when they realized that the risk under discussion 
was being driven lower than the composite spacecraft 
risk, i.e., assuring the payload was less likely to 
experience a failure than the spacecraft that was 
carrying it! This was when the team really understood 
what it meant to be Class D. It meant having a 
sufficient understanding of the risks to know when to 
not mitigate and, instead, liquidate, i.e. save the 
mitigation money and schedule for other purposes. This 
approach is not easy, but if cost/schedule are 
independent variables, technical risk needs to managed 
as the dependent variable. 
LESSON: Stable Stakeholder Requirements Are 
Essential 
LCROSS was “decommissioned” with the same 
requirements set in which it was initiated. Period. The 
LCROSS team benefitted from having a stakeholder 
community that was willing to establish a set of 
requirements they could stand behind and not change. It 
is difficult to explain how important this is to the 
executing team. There are many examples, both inside 
and outside the Agency, where requirements creep by 
the stakeholders becomes the undoing of the project, 
leading to its ultimate failure in requirements, schedule 
and/or budget. Requirements creep usually manifests 
itself by a multitude of “minor change requests” that 
slowly disrupt the team’s focus and eventually lead to 
some systems engineering difficulties. 
Stable requirements are essential to minimize 
perturbations to the team momentum. An example came 
early in the LCROSS mission prior to the Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR). The LCROSS PM was 
approached by a senior stakeholder asking to add the 
capability of two wireless routers from a local high-tech 
firm to the mission, along with accompanying wireless 
cameras to be able to demonstrate the first use of 
wireless routers in space. Although an enticing idea at 
first, (who wouldn’t want to do this!) the team 
conducted an investigation on what such an 
implementation would involve and found that while this 
was not a big tax on any single performance metric, it 
was a small tax on nearly every performance metric. 
Everything from mass, to volume, to power, to thermal, 
to flight worthiness, to testing, etc was affected. This 
“small change”, even pre-PDR was not only going to 
change most everything, it would consume “freeboard 
margins”.  Further, it crossed ownership lines since one 
of these units would have to fly on the Centuar, thereby 
involving the launch provider’s design as well, 
changing Interface Control Documents (ICDs) growing 
system complexity. This was a mess. This genuinely 
clever idea that the team actually wanted to implement, 
was growing the project risk substantially, distracting 
the team from the core project objectives. To the 
stakeholder’s credit, they were able to back away from 
this request. 
LCROSS PROGRAMMATIC SUMMARY 
The key to capabilities-driven, cost-capped missions 
like LCROSS is to keep it simple and to manage the 
risk equation. It is not about eliminating risk, which is 
very costly. It is about managing risk to a level 
commensurate with project programmatic constraints. 
LCROSS did this by making use of existing 
investments by the Agency, existing commercial 
hardware, and being sufficiently creative to see 
opportunities to buy-down risk.   
Ultimately, LCROSS succeeded because the individuals 
and organizations in the LCROSS team walked a shared 
road on a mission to the Moon and worked together to 
make it succeed. Each party on this team had both 
mutual and self-interests for why they wanted to 
participate. The Agency wanted to show that there was 
an effective way to make use of excess launch 
capability and to work cheaply; NASA ARC wanted to 
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show it was able to run small, fast-paced, lightweight 
missions; NG wanted to show that it could be nimble 
and carve out a new market for itself; and the 
commercial sector found an onramp to space and lunar 
applications which could propel their businesses into a 
new market. One of the great successes of LCROSS 
was aligning each the team member’s needs into a 
common purpose which benefited everyone in a win-
win-win scenario. 
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